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ABSTRACT: Debates over scientists’ appropriate contributions to policy-making are prominent in a variety of 
natural resources fields. The issue is often presented as one of “responsible advocacy.” But this framing locks us 
into a paradox: Scientists who advocate aim to be effective in the policy arena, but by advocating lose their 
credibility. In this preliminary review of the issue, I argue that we can avoid the paradox by acknowledging a 
wider range of speech acts structuring scientists’ obligations in the policy process. Scientists can advocate–but 
they can also report, give their assessments, make recommendations, and especially, offer good advice. 
KEYWORDS: science-policy interface, scientists, advocacy, advice, credibility, trustworthiness. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We need scientists to contribute to public deliberations over wicked problems: wicked 
problems as local as development in the floodplain here in Ames and as global as the 
wickedest problem of them all, climate change. Managing the interface between science and 
democratic policy-making is itself a wicked problem, however, as suggested by the variety of 
ways that have been proposed to describe what is going wrong. Is the problem that we have too 
much or too little public participation in decisions that have a technical aspect (Collins & 
Evans, 2007; Wynne, 2003)? Is it that science is being politicized, and/or that politics is being 
scientized (Weingart, 2002)? In this paper, I want to focus on yet another approach to 
conceptualizing what is going wrong between scientists and citizens: an approach that takes 
advocacy by scientists as either a key problem in—or a leading solution to—getting the 
nation’s wealth of science into the policy process. Scientists, it is argued, should or should not 
advocate in the policy realm; or if they should advocate, they should only do it responsibly, in 
accordance with some set of guidelines. 
 This framing of the problem at the boundary between science and policy is of interest 
for at least two reasons. First, talk of “(responsible) advocacy” directs our attention to the 
specifically communicative conduct of scientists on particular occasions. This raises the hope 
that communication scholarship such as that in evidence at this conference may have 
something useful to say, by way of refining—or challenging—conceptions of advocacy.  
 Second, “(responsible) advocacy” is a conception of communication at the 
science/policy interface that is being advanced within scientific communities. Some of the 
conversation within biology fields will be reviewed below; for now, it may be enough to point 
to the series of events on “advocacy in science” that have been organized at the national level 
since 2006 (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2006, 2008, 2011). The 
invocation of “(responsible) advocacy” by scientists gives the conception a certain validity; it 
deserves respect as an attempt by skilled practitioners to articulate the ideals which regulate 
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their communication practice (Craig & Tracy, 1995). Further, the debate over “(responsible) 
advocacy” opens opportunities for interdisciplinary dialogue. While many scientists may resist 
learning about theories of science in society put forward by humanities or social science 
scholars who study science, they may welcome outsiders who can offer increased clarity for 
conceptions they are already deploying.  
 In the next section of this paper I sketch the debate as it has occurred in one scientific 
community, identifying the main reasons advanced for and against scientists’ obligation to 
advocate and the normative standards that have been proposed in order to mitigate some of 
advocacy’s undesirable consequences. I next review what we know about the normative 
structure of the ordinary communicative activity of advocating. Audiences have strong 
expectations about what a good advocate will do. In light of these expectations, what is called 
“responsible” advocacy by scientists will either be taken as bad advocacy, or simply ignored. 
Does this relieve scientists of the obligation to participate in policy-making? I close by arguing 
a strong “no.” There are many alternative communicative activities through which scientists 
can contribute to deliberations. Among these, the act of advising stands out as achieving many 
of the high purposes identified by proponents of responsible advocacy. I conclude that when 
scientists talk of “responsible advocacy”, what they really mean is “good advice.”  
2. ADVOCACY BY SCIENTISTS: THE STATE OF THE DEBATE IN ONE 
DISCIPLINARY COMMUNITY 
Discussions of advocacy by scientists have occurred in a variety of scientific fields as well as 
in scholarship on science. In this preliminary survey of the issue, I will focus almost 
exclusively on discussions within biology fields related to natural resources: ecology, 
conservation biology, invasion biology, marine biology, wildlife management and forestry, for 
example. Commitments to—and concerns about—involvement in policy-making have deep 
historical roots in these fields (Nelkin, 1977), and continue to provoke deep disagreements 
(Young & Larson, 2011). Their love of the natural world pushes these scientists into policy 
arenas, especially when they perceive the biodiversity and ecosystems they cherish under 
imminent threat of annihilation (Barry & Oelschlaeger, 1996; Myers, 1999). They also 
experience a pull into policy-making from environmental advocacy groups (Kaiser, 2000; 
Lindeman, 2007) and natural resource managers and regulators (Mills & Clark, 2001; Steel, 
List, Lach, & Shindler, 2004) who welcome their expertise. The nature and ethics of advocacy 
has thus been the subject of discussion in dedicated fora at conferences and in journals (e.g., 
Conservation Biology 10.3, 1996; 21.1, 2007; Human Dimensions of Wildlife 6.1, 2001; 
BioScience 51.6, 2001). In addition, a series of empirical studies have surveyed attitudes 
towards and conceptions of advocacy among natural resource scientists and other stakeholders 
(Gray & Campbell, 2009; Kinchy & Kleinman, 2003; Lach, List, Steel, & Shindler, 2003; J. 
Scott et al., 2007; J. M. Scott & Rachlow, 2011; Steel et al., 2004; Young & Larson, 2011) 
 Within this literature, “policy advocacy” is commonly and I believe correctly defined 
as activity aimed to support a policy proposal (Ehrlich, 2001; Gill, 2001; Lach et al., 2003; 
Lackey, 2007; J. M. Scott & Rachlow, 2011). It “involves advancing the most convincingly 
reasoned suggestions for change, informed by defensible, rigorous evidence” (Foote, Krogman, 
& Spence, 2009).  
 Those defending the legitimacy of advocacy argue:  
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• Pro 1: that their science is inherently value-laden, and thus that pursuing objective 
knowledge cannot be separated from advocacy for valued outcomes; pretending 
anything else will only lead to value commitments being covert and unexamined 
(Barry & Oelschlaeger, 1996; Noss, 2007; Shrader-Frechette, 1996; for a trenchant 
defense of a version of this view, see also Sarewitz, 2004, 2012) 
• Pro 2: that all citizens, including scientists, are required to serve the public good and 
participate in democratic policy-making (Blockstein, 2002; Kaiser, 2000; Karr, 2006) 
• Pro 3: that scientists’ special knowledge gives them a special obligation to contribute 
to the common good (Karr, 2006; Lovejoy, 1989; Nelson & Vucetich, 2009) 
• Pro 4: that scientists as recipients of public support are obligated to contribute back 
their knowledge to help solve public problems (Foote et al., 2009; Karr, 2006) 
• Pro 5: that if scientists don’t advocate on policy issues, the vacuum will be filled by 
misinformation from interested stakeholders; further, failure to advocate for change is 
equivalent to advocating for the status quo (Foote et al., 2009; Karr, 2006; Nelson & 
Vucetich, 2009) 
Those questioning the legitimacy of advocacy, and perhaps even calling for its complete 
avoidance, argue:  
• Con 1: that scientific objectivity requires scientists to aspire to a value-free stance (or 
a stance committing them only to epistemic values like objectivity) which is 
incompatible with advocacy (Tracy & Brussard, 1996) 
• Con 2: that scientists who advocate will experience negative consequences, including 
time lost from research, lowered reputation among peers, and personal attacks by 
political opponents (Foote et al., 2009; Karr, 2006) 
• Con 3: that advocacy will tend to corrupt the scientific process, e.g. illegitimately 
influencing the interpretation of data, either because advocacy will tend to distort the 
scientist’s own reasoning process, or because the scientist will be forced to “keep up 
appearances” once committed to a specific policy (Aron, Burke, & Freeman, 2002; 
Kaiser, 2000; Lackey, 2007; Nielsen, 2001; Wiens, 1997) 
• Con 4: that independent of the actual integrity of their science, scientist-advocates will 
be perceived as being motivated by personal interests, with the result that their 
credibility or trustworthiness as scientists will come into question, and indirectly, the 
credibility/trustworthiness of their field and of the scientific enterprise as a whole 
(Gill, 2001; Lackey, 2007; Mills & Clark, 2001; Rykiel Jr, 2001; J. Scott et al., 2007) 
• Con 5: that scientists are poorly prepared to be policy advocates, and are better off 
leaving that task to professionals (Aron et al., 2002) 
 The clash between Pro 1 and Con 1, while significant, raises epistemological issues 
beyond the scope of this paper. Further, it seems to me that scientists and ordinary citizens 
should be able to figure out what communicative activity is appropriate on a particular 
occasion, without waiting for philosophers to definitively solve the puzzle of values in the 
scientific process. In this, as in many other cases (e.g., Goodwin, 2002), skilled communicators 
must work out practical solutions to (or work-arounds for) theoretical problems. Objection Con 
2, as has been pointed out by Nelson and Vucetich (2009) does not have much relevance to a 
debate over scientists’ obligation to advocate; advocacy could still be owed, even if it is hard 
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and painful. Objection Con 3 raises a significant psychological point; but in this paper I will 
take scientists’ avowals of their own integrity at face value. Pro/Con 5, finally, raise interesting 
empirical questions about who is to blame for the present dismal state of science 
communication; these are both beyond the scope of this paper, and also tend to advocacy 
themselves. 
 It is consideration Con 4 (credibility with the broader public) that has proven to be the 
most compelling, judging by the number of replies it has attracted. Where Con 3 focuses on the 
trustworthiness of the science produced by the scientist-advocate, Con 4 focuses on the 
trustworthiness of the scientist-advocate herself (for this distinction, see Goodwin, 2011)—and 
in particular, on the trustworthiness of the scientist-advocate manifest to her audience of 
citizens and policy-makers. One response has been to declare this concern negligible. Scientists 
are not to blame (it is argued) if the public wrongly perceives them as being biased when in 
fact they are promoting the public good (Nelson & Vucetich, 2009). But blaming only citizens 
for the breakdown of trust between scientists and citizens seems—well, a little too convenient 
a response from the scientific community. More commonly, proponents of advocacy respond 
to Con 4 by imposing limits on advocacy, so that advocacy when correctly pursued will not in 
fact threaten scientists’ manifest trustworthiness. Principles of “responsible” (Foote et al., 
2009) or “honest” (Noss, 2007) advocacy that have been proposed include:  
• RA 1: scientist-advocates should be fully open about their value commitments, 
interests, funding sources, etc. (Foote et al., 2009; Meyer, Frumhoff, Hamburg, & de 
la Rosa, 2010; Nielsen, 2001)  
• RA 2: scientist-advocates should change their public positions when the evidence 
demands it (Meyer et al., 2010; Nelson & Vucetich, 2009; Noss, 2007) 
• RA 3: scientist-advocates should advocate only on topics within their areas of 
expertise, and/or should openly indicate where they are going beyond their expertise 
(Foote et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2010) 
• RA 4: scientist-advocates should not (like “sophists”—Nelson, 2009) use the most 
effective arguments for their policy positions; they should use only the best available, 
peer-reviewed, data-supported science to make their cases (Blockstein, 2002; Foote et 
al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2010; Nelson & Vucetich, 2009) 
• RA 5: scientist-advocates should be fully open about uncertainties, margins of error, 
and caveats (Blockstein, 2002; Meyer et al., 2010) 
• RA 6: scientist-advocates should bring forward counter-considerations that weigh 
against the policies for which they advocate (Foote et al., 2009; Nielsen, 2001) 
• RA 7: scientist-advocates should avoid hyperbole (Blockstein, 2002; Meyer et al., 
2010) 
 Many of these normative principles are attractive. I do wish scientists would heed 
them, or at least some of them, when engaging with me and other citizens on policy issues. 
However, we don’t expect advocates to follow them, whether scientists or not; and for good 
reason. The ordinary communicative activity of advocating already has norms. These aren’t 
them. 
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3. THE NORMS OF THE ORDINARY COMMUNICATIVE ACTIVITY OF 
ADVOCATING 
As consumers in a capitalist economy, members of a litigious society, and citizens in an 
adversarial democracy, we are quite familiar with advocacy. Our well-being depends in part on 
recognizing advocacy when we’re subject to it, and we are capable of judging advocacy as 
good or bad. What are the norms we use in making such judgments?1  
 A full analysis of the communicative activity of advocating has not yet been 
accomplished. In the meantime, a good place to start is with the central normative principle 
articulated for legal advocates: to represent their clients “zealously, within the bounds of the 
law” (American Bar Association [ABA], 1983, Canon 7; or, “as advocate, a lawyer zealously 
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system,” ABA, 2004). When we 
say that an attorney was a “good advocate,” we don’t necessarily mean that she won her suit. 
We do mean that she did everything she could, given the facts, laws and procedures, to urge 
the judge or jury to reach a decision in her client’s favor—everything short of outright 
dishonesties like presenting evidence that she knew was fake or bribing a juror. A zealous 
advocate is responsible for making the strongest case possible on behalf of the position her 
client has taken. 
 The norm of zeal is not imposed on legal proceedings from the outside; it is invoked 
by the participants in legal proceedings themselves, as I have shown in a study of the closing 
arguments of the OJ Simpson criminal trial (Goodwin, 2001). The excellent (or at least 
expensive) advocates there excused the length of the trial by explaining that they were bound 
to take as much time as necessary to defend their clients, for example. They also argued that 
when their opponents had not produced evidence in support of one of their points, it must be 
because there was no such evidence, since their opponents were bound to support their position 
as strongly as they could. In these and similar arguments, advocates were encouraging the jury 
to recall and apply the basic presumption that advocates ought to be zealous, attempting to 
make the best case possible. 
 We don’t necessarily like to be subjected to another’s zeal. Zealous advocacy 
obviously is good for who- or whatever the advocate is speaking for. But when we’re the 
audience of advocacy, why is it good for us? Often it isn’t; so it’s not surprising that a common 
response to advocacy is to ignore or resist it. Indeed, a large part of instruction in “critical 
thinking” consists in helping students recognize and withstand advocacy directed at them.  
 Why then do we keep advocacy around as a social practice? What use could it be? In 
some cases, good advocacy allows us to make prudent use of our own scarce cognitive 
resources. We can, for example, presume that the evidence or arguments are no stronger than 
the zealous advocate has made them out to be (Klonoff & Colby, 2007). If the best evidence 
that an advocate can produce is ambiguous, or the best arguments weak, we may be able to 
dismiss her position efficiently, without ourselves investing in a search for evidence or an 
                                                
1 I employ here without defending a normative conception of communicative (speech) acts initially put forward 
by Paul Grice, elaborated by Dennis Stampe and brought into argumentation studies by Fred Kauffeld 
(Kauffeld, 2009). In this view, in any given speech act the speaker undertakes a specific set of responsibilities 
to the auditor—undertakings which give the auditor a good reason to respond in the desired way. Every 
instance of a speech act can thus be seen as creating a local “normative terrain” between speaker and auditor. 
The speaker’s conspicuous undertaking and fulfillment of the local normative requirements is what allows the 
speech act to be effective; echoing Hegel, for a speech act, “the practical is the normative.” 
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elaboration of our own reasoning. In fact, we can save even more time by making sure that we 
receive advocacy from both sides. That way we can not only benefit from the advocates 
making the best cases for us, we can also count on them to make obvious to us the weaknesses 
in each other’s arguments. Advocacy, in sum, outsources some of the work of reasoning. 
 Still, despite their occasional usefulness, we have mixed feelings about the ethical 
status of advocates. On one hand, the advocate’s norm of zeal is in some ways stronger than 
the obligation of veracity binding any speaker who says something seriously; as when I tell 
you that the food at The Café is good, I am not obliged to defend that statement by every 
means necessary. From this perspective, dedicating oneself to “speaking for” a cause has a 
certain nobility. But in other ways, the norm of zeal is more limited than the norms of ordinary 
sayings. In particular, we understand that in advocating a position zealously, an advocate may 
not believe everything she is saying. As long as she is not saying something that she knows is 
untrue, she may be putting forward colorable claims that she would not personally endorse. 
The case she makes has to be good; it does not have to be her own. Indeed, court rules 
traditionally prohibit advocates from “vouching”—making known their personal opinions on 
the case—and advocates at the Simpson trial actively encouraged jurors not to believe their 
say-so (but see Audi, 1995; Goodwin, 2001). From this perspective, “speaking for” a cause has 
a certain baseness. An advocate is capable of saying for another things that the other cannot 
truthfully say for him or herself. The accused cannot make claims such as “I wasn’t there at the 
time, and if I was, he hit me first,” since he knows which (if either) is true; the advocate not 
only can, but must—if it would support the plea. 
 It should be apparent from this brief discussion that the proposed norms of responsible 
advocacy by scientists are incompatible with the actual norms of the ordinary speech activity 
of advocating.  
 RA 1–3 require scientists-advocates to be open about their personal values, to draw 
only on their personal knowledge, and to defend only positions that they themselves hold after 
full consideration. Once a speaker has undertaken to be an advocate, however, the advocate’s 
personal values, knowledge and position are irrelevant. She will be presumed to be committed 
to defending her position, whatever her personal values. She will be expected to seek out all 
the evidence that will support her position, whatever her personal expertise. And she will be 
expected to continue to defend her position even when it becomes apparent that other positions 
have something to say for themselves.  
 RA 4–7 restrict the kinds of rhetorical techniques scientist-advocates can deploy. 
While sometimes the best science may also be the grounds for the strongest argument for her 
position, the advocate is committed to drawing from it not because it is best, but because it 
helps her make her case. Similarly, an advocate may judge that revealing weaknesses, 
uncertainties and opposing considerations may help her defend her position (the jury is out on 
this, in communication theory); if so, she ought to be open about them, but only because it is 
the zealous thing to do. And as for hyperbole—where would an advocate be without a little of 
that? 
 In short, following the proposed rules for responsible advocacy may frequently render 
the scientist-advocate a bad advocate. Now, that might be a necessary sacrifice, if it helped 
preserve her credibility and the credibility of her science—that is, if following the rules would 
reduce the concerns about advocacy by scientists expressed in Con 4. Unfortunately, even open 
and explicit commitments to the proposed rules will be unlikely to preserve the scientist’s 
manifest trustworthiness. As soon as an audience understands that they are listening to an 
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advocate, they will presume that everything she says is in the service of zealously making her 
case. Avowals of personal commitment, personal knowledge, personal expertise, of reliance on 
the best evidence and of full transparency about weaknesses—all will be discounted as 
attempts to bolster her case. The audience of a scientist-advocate will allow her to be a bad 
advocate, but won’t permit her to be a responsible one. 
4. BEYOND ADVOCACY 
It would be unfortunate if we were faced with a choice between advocacy by scientists and 
their silence, since neither serves to get reliable knowledge into the policy process. Luckily, we 
have other options. “There are many ways” for scientists “to express and act upon values” 
within the policy process, as one article has put it (Meine & Meffe, 1996); “the notion that a 
scientist is either an advocate or does nothing at all to shape policy is a false dichotomy that 
has muddied the debate about science and advocacy” (J. M. Scott & Rachlow, 2011).  
 Indeed, within the debate in natural resource fields we find already named a variety of 
other communicative activities scientists could undertake. The empirical work has largely 
relied upon a five part categorization developed by Steel and his colleagues based on 
interviews with ecologists (Lach et al., 2003): reporting, interpreting, integrating, advocating, 
and deciding. Blockstein (2002) identifies interpretation (which he also calls reporting), advice 
and counsel as alternatives to advocacy; Minnis and McPeake (2001) distinguish education and 
promotion from advocacy. Even those defending advocacy tend to refer to other 
communicative activities when discussing the details of what scientists ought to do: informing 
(Brussard & Tull, 2007), assessing (Meyer et al., 2010; Nelson & Vucetich, 2009), 
recommending (Meyer et al., 2010; Noss, 2007) and advising (Meyer et al., 2010). 
 We can appreciate how different these communicative activities are from each other, 
and from advocacy, by considering a decision context more familiar than the realm of policy-
making. Imagine you have been diagnosed with a serious illness. You might look to your 
doctor to report to you what is known about the success rate of the different treatment options; 
to offer her assessment of the different options; to recommend the option that in her judgment 
has proven most successful; to advise you to choose a specific treatment; or to advocate for one 
treatment. Each of these establishes its own normative expectations–each of them establishes a 
specific, normatively charged relationship between your doctor and you. Your doctor is 
undertaking different obligations to you when reporting than when recommending, for 
example; in reporting, you expect her to be accurate and thorough (and you would criticize her 
if she weren’t), while in recommending, you expect her to employ her best judgment. 
 In general, we don’t want our doctors to advocate; when my dentist did, I began to 
think he was more interested in getting me to pay for an expensive bit of equipment than in 
alleviating my pain, and switched practitioners. In ordinary parlance, what we often seek is a 
doctor’s advice. Similarly, when policy-makers seek scientists’ help, they often organize them 
into “advisory committees” and ask them to produce “advisory reports.” Let us look briefly 
then at the normative standards underlying the ordinary communicative act of advising, as 
developed in the work of Fred Kauffeld (esp. 1999). 
 Kauffeld started from the presumption that we all should be minding our own 
business. Every individual is autonomous, with the right to make his or her own decisions on 
matters of concern to him or her. Occasionally, however, situations arise where someone else 
may actually know better. As Kauffeld has noted, in these situations “talking to another about 
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that person’s concerns is a delicate matter for both parties.” The auditor may be legitimately 
cautious about why the speaker is going out of her way to share her knowledge: is it for the 
speaker’s own good, or for the auditor’s? As Kauffeld has reminded us,  
We are all, I think, familiar with and resent the prospect that what others want to tell us about our 
business will amount to little more than meddlesome interference which complicates the task of 
taking care of our concerns but provides little assistance, because the interference issues from the 
other’s perspective and is not based on an understanding our situation and responsibilities. 
The speaker may be equally concerned to avoid the appearance of intruding into the auditor’s 
business. How then can the speaker’s knowledge get communicated? 
 The communicative act of advising is a practical solution to this “delicate” problem. 
In Kauffeld’s analysis,  
Where a speaker gives advice, (i) she tells the advisee something which she at least purports to 
believe he needs to know, and (ii) she openly takes responsibility for trying assist him in 
determining what to do about his concerns. 
The speaker’s second undertaking—her acceptance of responsibility for addressing the 
auditor’s concerns—opens the speaker to resentment, criticism and even perhaps reprisal 
should it become apparent that she isn’t out to serve him. The auditor can thus reasonably 
presume that the speaker would not undertake such a risk unless she was indeed proceeding 
with his concerns in mind. The open undertaking thus alleviates the concern both speaker and 
auditor might have about meddling, and opens the way for the auditor to consider the speaker’s 
advice in making up his mind. 
 Applied to the case of interest in this paper, Kauffeld’s account of advising suggests 
that what citizens are looking for from scientist-advisors is not a value-free disinterestedness, 
but instead a dedication to their interests. Citizens expect the scientist-advisor to take 
responsibility for helping them make decisions that will further their own concerns. From this 
perspective, the proposed principles of responsible advocacy are not norms for scientific 
advice; a scientist can give good advice without, for example, providing all the considerations 
pro and con. Instead, the principles appear to be useful methods for the speaker to provide 
extra reassurances to her audience that she is indeed speaking with their concerns in mind. 
Such supererogatory efforts may be necessary to bolster audiences’ trust in purported scientist-
advisors during policy controversies where the stakes are high, the interests diverse, and the 
conflicts of interest apparent. Consider: 
 The scientist-advisor’s openness about her own interests (RA 1) positions the 
audience to better assess whether she is honestly trying to assist them, or is really out for 
herself. Her willingness to reveal what is normally private information also demonstrates the 
depth of her concern for them. 
 The scientist-advisor’s openness about the limits of her knowledge (RA 3), about 
uncertainties (RA 5) and counter-considerations (RA 6) again serve to put the audience in a 
better position to judge the quality of her advice. Providing this additional information over 
and above the core of what the audience “needs to know” (point (i) in Kauffeld’s analysis 
above) reinforces the audience’s ability to make an autonomous decision, and confirms that the 
scientist-advisor is not meddling. 
 Finally, the principle that the scientist-advisor be willing to change her advice when 
her assessment of the science changes (RA 4) also bolsters the trustworthiness of what she 
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says. Unless the concerns of the advisor and advisee are manifestly different, it seems odd if an 
advisor won’t take her own advice. And that oddity raises reasonable suspicions that the advice 
is not well-intended.  
 In sum, while RA 1–7 are either irrelevant to or bad for scientist-advocates, they may 
often be good working principles for scientist-advisors in policy contexts. So when the natural 
resources scientists talk of “responsible advocacy,” what they really seem to mean is “good 
advice.” 
4. CONCLUSION 
The arguments Pro 2–4 (and possibly Pro 1 as well) all give strong reasons—reasons for 
scientists to contribute to the policy process somehow. But, as I have argued, there are many 
communicative activities through which that contribution can be made. 
 Advocacy is one. Scientists, like all citizens, have the right to advocate zealously for 
policies they believe will serve the public good. In fact, scientists can make quite good 
advocates, since they start with a deep knowledge of the issue and are well-positioned to select 
and develop the strongest appeals. 
 But inevitably, such advocacy will have the consequence of reducing the scientists’ 
credibility to zero. Advocates undertake to make a case, not to convey their best judgment. 
Audiences who even suspect the presence of advocacy will presume that what they hear is the 
strongest defense of a position, not the best science relevant to it.  
 When scientists and citizens want scientists’ knowledge—not their arguments—
respected, scientists must refrain from advocating positions however dear to their hearts and, in 
their view, well-justified by the best scientific results. This looks like a paradox: the more 
people know, the less politically effective we allow them to be. As Gill (2001) put it: 
When professionals decide to use the power of their expert knowledge to control policy outcomes, 
the public image of professionalism subtly metamorphoses. It transforms the professional’s role 
from reliable expert into competing interest, and credibility erodes. The erosion of credibility 
reduces political power and a paradoxical futile cycle ensues. The paradox lies in the fact that the 
political power of professionals can be retained only if it is not exercised. 
This paradox, however, is exactly what we should expect in a democratic polity: authority 
turns out to be self-limiting. When epistemic authority is exercised, both scientists and citizens 
have something at risk if their communicative transaction goes awry: scientists, their public 
repute; citizens, their sound decision-making. In the context of policy controversies, it is not 
surprising that it is difficult or impossible to get authority to work. 
 There are alternatives to advocacy—indeed, many alternatives. “It is time,” as Scott 
and Racklow have put it, “to shift the question from whether conservation professionals should 
be advocates to how the expertise of scientists and professional societies can be given greater 
weight in ongoing discussions regarding policies and management actions that affect biological 
diversity” (J. M. Scott & Rachlow, 2011). In advising and other communicative activities, by 
laying aside their personal values and views in favor of serving the deliberative process and the 
interests of the citizens they are addressing, scientists can make a contribution and preserve 
their manifest trustworthiness, both.  
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